Abstract. Dynamic and proof-conditional approaches to discourse (exemplified by Discourse Representation Theory and Type-Theoretical Grammar, respectively) are related through translations and transitions labeled by first-order formulas with anaphoric twists. Type-theoretic contexts are defined relative to a signature and instantiated model-theoretically, subject to change.
Introduction
Among the formal approaches to discourse semantics that have attracted some attention are "dynamic" formalisms such as Discourse Representation Theory (DRT, Kamp and Reyle [14] ) and proof-conditional programs such as TypeTheoretical Grammar (TTG, Ranta [24] ). Stretching traditions in formal logic, the former suggest (D) a shift from truth to input/output interpretations and the latter (P) the insertion of proofs into well-formed formulas.
The present paper focuses on applications of (D) and (P) to anaphora, linking the approaches in a first-order setting. Previous comparisons (e.g. Ahn and Kolb [2] ) are rigorously developed by taking up (on the one hand) modeltheoretic interpretations and (on the other) type systems.
A simple (but telling) illustration of some of the differences at stake is provided by Geach's notorious donkey sentence, (s), read as (t).
(s)
If a farmer owns a donkey, he beats it.
(t) ∀x∀y (farmer (x)∧donkey(y)∧owns(x, y) ⊃ beats(x, y))
A common point of departure for the approaches is the ill-formed formula (q) below, obtained from a piecemeal translation of (s), interpreting an indefinite description such as a farmer through existential quantification.
(q) (∃x ∈ farmer )(∃y ∈ donkey) owns(x, y) ⊃ beats(he,it)
As reformulated in Dynamic Predicate Logic (DPL, Groenendijk and Stokhof [11] ), DRT reduces he to the variable x and it to the variable y, resulting in (d).
(d) (∃x ∈ farmer )(∃y ∈ donkey) owns(x, y) ⊃ beats(x, y)
The trick is then to treat ∃z as a random assignment to z (familiar from Quantified Dynamic Logic, Harel [12] ), lifting the usual Tarskian satisfaction relation | = between first-order formulas ϕ and models M to input/output relations ||ϕ|| M on functions f, f from variables to objects in M such that roughly put,
(Details in §3.1 below.) By contrast, TTG extracts he and it from a constructive proof of (q)'s premiss, (∃x ∈ farmer )(∃y ∈ donkey) owns(x, y). That is, interpreting existential quantification (∃x ∈ A)B as the dependent sum/product TTG reduces (q) to (p), where lz and l(rz) pick out the farmer and donkey witnesses encoded in a constructive proof z of (q)'s premiss (l and r being 's l eft and r ight projections, respectively).
(p) ( z : ( x : farmer )( y : donkey) owns(x, y)) beats(lz, l(rz))
Notice that just as the clause a farmer owns a donkey is hypothetical within (s), so too is the proof z in (p), raising the question of instantiating such variable proofs model-theoretically.
Signatures, rules and interpretations
For a systematic comparison of dynamic with proof-conditional semantics, it is convenient to fix a (many-sorted, relational) signature L consisting of sorts (U, . . .) and relation symbols (R, . . .) with associated arities. Let us agree to write U ∈ L 0 to mean U is a sort in L, and R ∈ L(U 1 · · · U n ) to mean that R is a relation symbol in L with n arguments of sorts U 1 to U n . The L-formulas ϕ for dynamic semantics are generated from an infinite set Var of variables x 1 . . . according to
where U ∈ L 0 and R ∈ L(U 1 · · · U n ) for some U 1 , . . . , U n ∈ L 0 . 1 With the typetheoretic approach, the expressions are somewhat more complicated, and are 
the intuition being that [[R, u 1 · · · u n ]] consists of proofs of R(u 1 · · · u n ). Conversely, an arbitrary L-model M can be beefed up to an L-interpretation
Alternatively, if we allow types to intersect, we could fix a single object 0 and set 
Outline and note
Section 2 relates dynamic with proof-conditional semantics syntactically, exploring translations between first-order systems that equate (d) with (p). Section 3 takes up the semantics of these fragments, extensions to which are considered in section 4. Section 5 concludes by returning to the bold proposals (D) and (P) above, characteristic of dynamic and proof-conditional semantics.
Let us note at the outset that (D) and (P) are of interest beyond the particular applications to anaphora considered below -or, for that matter, variants involving, for example, "weak" readings of the donkey sentence (s) that only require every donkey-owning farmer to beat some donkey s/he owns. The hope is, however, that the present case study might throw some light on what (D) and (P) could more generally mean.
Translations and the rule set D •
Fix an infinite set Var of variables x and a signature L. Let the set Tm
• of preterms t consist of Var and its closure under the projections l and r
Corresponding to the L-formulas ϕ (for dynamic semantics) generated in §1.1 are the L-pretypes A generated from preterms t 1 . . . t n according to
The present section refines the notions of L-formula and L-pretype, making the syntactic correspondence between these precise.
The novel variable condition
A technical condition on L-formulas that will play a crucial role below is to ban a variable x from being bound (either by ∀ or ∃) after a reference to x has already been made in a formula. More precisely, the set of L-formulas ϕ that respect the novel variable condition (NVC) is defined inductively as follows:
(ii) if ϕ and ψ both respect NVC, and no variable bound in ψ occurs in ϕ (free or bound), then both ϕ ∧ ψ and ϕ ⊃ ψ respect NVC (iii) if ϕ respects NVC and the variable x does not occur bound in ϕ, then both (∀x ∈ U )ϕ and (∃x ∈ U )ϕ respect NVC (for U ∈ L 0 ).
In ordinary predicate logic (classical or intuitionistic), NVC is innocuous insofar as every formula can be assumed to respect NVC, by renaming bound variables if necessary (e.g. from
Renaming may change the meaning of a formula in the present applications to anaphora, however (concerning which, NVC follows a condition in Heim [13] that variables introduced for indefinites such as a farmer be novel). We will repeatedly require L-formulas to respect NVC throughout this section, reconsidering NVC semantically in § §3.1 and 5.2.
From L-formulas to L-pretypes and back
Next, we specify a translation of L-formulas to L-pretypes, systematizing the translation of (d) to (p). 2 An L-formula ϕ will be translated relative to (i) a well-ordering < of the infinite set Var of variables, from which we can define for every proper subset X of Var, a variable ν < X ∈ Var − X as the <-least variable not in X (making ν < X a distinguished variable that is X-novel) and (ii) a function θ from a finite subset of Var to the set Tm • of preterms.
The function θ need not fully specify translations of variables in ϕ. Indeed, writing ϕ < θ for the type-theoretic translation of ϕ, we will, with θ set trivially to ∅, arrange
where dom(θ) is the domain of θ and ↑ means undefined, 3
where in (1) and (2),
while new(ϕ) specifies the anaphoric possibilities offered by ϕ as follows. The
while (∃x ∈ U )ϕ and ϕ ∧ ψ are "dynamic" in that
The reader troubled by the use of equality = between possibly non-denoting terms should feel free to write Kleene equality instead. 
More generally, for ϕ's not derived from (d), there is the risk that θ may become non-functional. Fortunately, we can restrict computations of ϕ To reverse translations · < θ , let us lift a partial function γ from Tm
with γ x x = γ ∪ {(x, x)} and
where, paralleling new,
We have not only 
Projecting left and right: D •
Following Martin-Löf [19] , a context is a finite sequence of variable typings x : T , built from the empty sequence , the typings in which seep through an arrow ⇒ connecting the context (to ⇒'s left) with judgments (to ⇒'s right) that the context supports.
The side condition NVC on the last rule above is that x is a variable in Var different from any that occurs in Γ or T , bound or free. Going beyond usual formulations, the prohibition in NVC against reusing bound variables will make life easier. The stipulation is, however, harmless in a sense made precise in §3.2 below.
Departing somewhat more from Martin-Löf, let us introduce a symbol wff for well-formed L-pretypes, distinguishing these from sorts in L, which we will also take as types. 4 
Γ context
Notice that ⇒ ought really to be decorated with L, but we will suppress the subscript L on ⇒ L for simplicity. L-formulas other than ⊥ can be matched by rules for atomic L-formulas
and ∃x ∈ U and ∀x ∈ U
Terms such as lz and l(rz) in (p) can be formed from the familiar elimination rules for .
Now, putting further rules aside for the moment, let D • denote the set of rules above.
Conventions. L-pretypes obtained from the rules (∧) and (⊃) where the variable x bound does not occur in B are more perspicuously written
for certain novel (dummy) variables u and v.
As a set of rules, D • induces the usual notion of a derivation. Let us collect the D • -derivable contexts in the set
Let us gather the preterms t that a sequence Γ sorts in the set
is either a variable or has the form lt where
where ≈ is equality up to renaming of variables x bound by (Qx :
Proof. Part (a) follows by induction on L-pretypes A, parts (b) and (c) by induction on the length of D • -derivations.
A simple example where
where R ∈ L(U ) and U = U . Sidestepping such sortal complications, we get
Proposition 4. Suppose L has exactly one sort. Then for every L-formula ϕ respecting NVC, there exists
. . , x n : U where U is the one sort of L, and x 1 . . . x n is a non-repeating list of every variable with some free but no bound occurrence 5 The notation · 
An obvious extension of Proposition 4 is
If L has exactly one sort, then for every convergent pair ϕ, θ, there exists Γ such that theta(Γ) = θ and 'Γ ⇒ • ϕ < theta(Γ) wff'. That assertion is demonstrably false, however, as not every such θ is of the form theta(Γ) for some Γ. Take θ = {(x, ly), (z, lly)}.
Interpretations: transitions and bisimulations
Next comes semantics. The notion of an L-interpretation described in §1.1 points in two opposite directions. We can reduce an L-interpretation
, relative to which L-formulas ϕ can be interpreted dynamically. Or, going the other way, we can extend [[·] ] to interpret various constructs connected with D • . We will pursue both directions, sequentially and then in parallel. Among the results to be established is that whenever 'Γ ⇒ • A wff', proofconditional and dynamic semantics agree in that for every "
The precise statement of the equivalence is given in Lemma 6c; but first we must understand what the phrases in quotes mean.
Dynamic semantics with finite functions
As mentioned back in the introduction, dynamic semantics interprets an Lformula ϕ relative to an L-model M as an input/output relation ||ϕ|| M between functions f and f from variables to objects in M
storing "suitable" witnesses in the output. Now, the semantic force of the novel variable condition, NVC, on ϕ is to avoid re-assigning values to variables, preserving (as it were) all witnesses ever found. Accordingly, it is useful to assume that f and f are not defined on every variable in Var (contrary to DPL, but in line with DRT). In fact, we will make do with finite functions, drawing f and f from the set Var M of functions from finite subsets of Var to the universe
The binary relations ||ϕ|| M ⊆ Var M × Var M encoding input/output pairs of Lformulas ϕ are then given as follows. 7 Keeping (3) in mind, let ||⊥|| M = ∅ (as ⊥ can never be true),
a falls outside Var M and has no chance of being in the domain of any ||ϕ|| M . The definition of f x a ensures that whenever
(with f = f in case new(ϕ) = ∅, as defined in §2.2). It will become clear shortly that the persistence described in (5) is instrumental in matching ϕ up with a type in D • .
That match-up involves the following standard notion from model theory (e.g. Keisler [15] ). A partial isomorphism between L-models M and N (possibly the same) is a relation I ⊆ Var M × Var N such that ∅I∅, and whenever f Ig,
Among the many well-known facts about partial isomorphisms is that if the universes of M and N are countable and if for every
Furthermore, partial isomorphisms are exactly bisimulations (Park [22] ) over (|| · || M , ∅) and (|| · || N , ∅). 8 That is, a relation I ⊆ Var M × Var N such that ∅I∅ is a partial isomorphism between M and N iff for all f Ig, (b1) whenever f ||ϕ|| M f , there is a g such that g||ϕ|| N g and f Ig , and (b2) whenever g||ϕ|| N g , there is an f such that f ||ϕ|| M f and f Ig .
Notice that whereas ϕ ranges over all L-formulas in (b1) and (b2), the only L-formulas that figure in the previous clauses (c1)-(c3) defining partial isomorphisms are of the form
where is an L-tautology such as ⊥ ⊃ ⊥. The discrepancy here is accounted for by two facts (where ¬ϕ is defined as ϕ ⊃ ⊥):
in ( * ) using only ∧ and ¬ such that
(ii) the back-and-forth force common to (b1),(b2) and (c1)-(c3) builds in closure under the connectives ∧ and ¬.
The remainder of this section is devoted to reducing a suitable notion of bisimulation equivalence for the rule set D • to ∼ = p . Towards that end, we will need to extend L-interpretations to various constructs in D • .
Extending L-interpretations
simultaneously (by induction on the length of a D • -derivation) with
is easily met by agreeing that
and adopting , notation at the meta-level, with : replaced by ∈ (abusing the object level notation for L-formulas),
re-using l and r at the meta-language.
The definition above brings us very close to the truth equivalence mentioned at the beginning of this section. The impatient reader can jump to Lemma 6c in the next subsection, and verify it by induction (using the definition of (Γ, ρ) • given before the lemma). For an equivalence reaching beyond truth and applying to transitions, a bit more work is necessary, including some points about alphabetic invariance. Over sorts or L-pretypes T and T , let ∼ be the equivalence T ∼ T iff T and T are identical up to renaming of bound variables (with the usual provisos for safe renaming). We extend ∼ to sequences of typings (that may or may not belong to context • ) as follows
The following is trivial, but nevertheless worth recording.
One of the upshots of Proposition 5 is that the semantics above is unaltered by relaxing the side condition NVC in §2.3 to its usual formulation (i.e. x is not one of the variables Γ types). That aside, Proposition 5 will prove useful below in conjunction with D • (defined using NVC ). 
Transitions between context instantiations
, it is a small step to binary relations
and pairing them with their instantiations in 
Proof. Part (c) is immediate from parts (a) and (b), which are proved by induction on A (conveniently enough matching the length of D • -derivations).
Moving from truth (analyzed in Lemma 6c) to transitions, let us fix an L- 
Let us write ([[·]], (Γ, ρ)) ↔ ([[·]] , (Γ , ρ )) iff (Γ, ρ)B(Γ , ρ ) for some [[·]], [[·]] -bisimulation B .
To relate ↔ to partial isomorphism ∼ = p from §3.1, the following notion of Γ and Γ being Tm • -coincident is useful. Define
the point of the second conjunct being that Γ and Γ use the same variables
. Now comes the type reduction from which the present paper gets its title. For all L-models M and N , and context-instantiation pairs
The intuition behind ≈ • is that before applying · • and ∼ = p , bound variables may need to be renamed to ensure that the contexts are Tm • -coincident.
Theorem 7. Let [[·]] and [[·]] be L-interpretations, possibly but not necessarily identical. For all context-instantiation pairs
(Γ, ρ) ∈ CI • [[·]] and (Γ , ρ ) ∈ CI • [[·]] , ([[·]], (Γ, ρ)) ↔ ([[·]] , (Γ , ρ )) iff (M[[·]], (Γ, ρ)) ≈ • (M[[·]] , (Γ , ρ )) .
Proof. To simplify the notation, let us shorten M[[·]] to M , and M[[·]] to N .
Unlike previous proofs, the present argument proceeds not by induction on A, but by co-induction, the equivalence in question breaking into two halves.
(7a) The binary relation
is a partial isomorphism between M and N .
(7b) The binary relation
It is immediate from the definition of ↔ that (7b) gives the right-to-left direction of the equivalence above. To see that (7a) yields the converse, sup- 
To prove (7a), suppose
and let π be the inverse
. We are to verify clauses (c1)-(c3) in §3.1 defining partial isomorphisms, with f = (Γ, ρ) • 
for some z and a. By (6),
for some b, whence by Lemma 6a,
as required. Similarly for the converse. And indeed for (c2): if
whence by (6),
as required. Ditto for (c3).
Recalling
clauses (β0)-(β2) above (for [[·]], [[·]] -bisimulations), (β0) is immediate:
for some y, whence by Lemma 6a,
By (7) and the characterization of ∼ = p in terms of the bisimulation conditions (b1) and (b2) in §3.1,
for some b, which byΓ ∼ Γ and Proposition 5, turns to
, taking care of (β1). A similar chain of implications gives (β2).
Theorem 7 says that the extra bit an L-interpretation [[·]] has over the L-model M[[·]
] is inconsequential if, as is commonly agreed, the "essential" structure of transitions such as those in
We cannot expect to strengthen [ 
Extensions
The two previous sections have concentrated on simple fragments of dynamic and proof-conditional semantics. Do the results above carry over to extensions of these fragments? We turn first to proof-conditional semantics.
D and D[Ax]
For the match-up above with L-formulas, the rule set D • was confined to term constructors l and r. Obvious omissions include function application ap, pairing ·, · and λ-abstraction, which figure respectively in the elimination rule for
and the introduction rules for
In addition, from ⊥, we get a term 0 saying that ⊥ entails every well-formed formula Γ ⇒ A wff Γ ⇒ 0 : ⊥ ⊃ A and, should we wish, terms δ A for double negation
(where, as usual, ¬A is A ⊃ ⊥). For reasons to become clear shortly, we take care to attach type subscripts A onto δ A .
Concentrating on the subscript-less constructs l, r, ap, ·, · , λ and 0 (and dropping the superscript in Tm • ), let Tm be the set of (extended) preterms t given by 
Indeed, Feferman [5] and Aczel [1] provide type-free interpretations for dependent types, verifying rules such as β-reduction
Whereas l, r, ap, ·, · , λ and 0 can be interpreted uniformly over all types T (by typing type-free combinators), a similar interpretation for double negation δ A is problematic. The obvious solution is to let the interpretation of δ A vary with 
Given a collection
∈ [[Γ]] D , form the set D[[Γ, ρ]] of L-pretypes supported by Γ, ρ, D[[Γ, ρ]] = {A | [[A]] D Γ,ρ = ∅} , choosing for A ∈ D[[Γ, ρ]] ∩ Ax, an element of [[A]] D Γ,ρ to interpret p A (relative to Γ, ρ).
Turning next to the preterms t that a D-context Γ assigns sorts, let
More interesting is the D-context
(where U ∈ L 0 and Succ ∈ L(U, U )), relative to which the preterms l(ap(x 1 , lx 2 )))) , . . . , t , l(ap(x 1 , t) ) , . . . all have type U , denoting, under the obvious L-interpretation and instantiation, the natural numbers 0, 1, 2, . . . , n, n+1, . . .. By contrast, for every Γ ∈ context • , Tm
• [Γ] is finite. Now, the difficulty in extending our reduction of D • to D is evident. Writing for ⊥ ⊃ ⊥ and assuming R ∈ L(U ), let Γ be x 1 : and Γ be x 1 : ( y : U )( z : U )R(z), both of which belong to context • and hence context D . While
Γ and Γ have very different wff's:
The previous example suggests a more sophisticated reduction of Γ ∈ context D than Tm D [Γ] . Writing Sk for Skolem functions, 10 let
the idea being that from t : (
10 Analogously, an alternative notation for Tm is He, for Henkin witnesses.
The problem, however, is that Sk misses out on preterms that take proofs as arguments, 11 such as a variable of type (
, u → 1 and u → 2, neither of which can (alone) match the map α : 2] ] -then α contains witnesses to both (∃z ∈ V )S(z) and (∃z ∈ V )¬S(z), whereas neither u → 1 nor u → 2 does (on its own). Although such examples may impress only readers concerned with the structure of transitions up to bisimulation, there is no denying that reification of proofs gives D considerable scope. That said, Skolem functions have attracted some attention in the discourse literature (e.g. Schubert [26] ), and carve out a fragment of D that we explore next.
D ∀ and a dynamic universal quantifier
A modest extension of D • capturing Skolem functions is the rule set D ∀ consisting of D • and
∀ , the set of preterms at stake being Var closed under l, r and ap. The obvious question is how to modify the translations A • Γ , reductions (Γ, ρ) • and transitions || · || (in dynamic semantics) to A ∀ Γ , (Γ, ρ) ∀ and || · || ∀ so that, for instance, the truth equivalence given by Lemma 6c becomes
Let us start with the translations A ∀ Γ , and see what extension to the notion of L-formula (in dynamic semantics) that leads to. 12 As with · • Γ , the definition proceeds by induction on A (with
A basic difference between classical and intuitionistic logic is that assuming x does not occur free in ϕ, the equivalence
holds in classical logic, but breaks down intuitionistically, as the x-witness in ϕ ⊃ (∃x)ψ may well depend on the proof of ϕ (which is unavailable at the start of (∃x)(ϕ ⊃ ψ)). Since D-derivations are intuitionistically sound, we cannot resort to prenex normal forms.
12 That extension can be motivated independently of proof-conditional semantics (Fernando [7] ).
where the translation t ∀ Γ , for every t such that Γ ⇒ ∀ t : U (for some U ∈ L 0 ), is given by
with sb(t) recording the substitutions in ap-subterms of t as follows
The difference with D • ( §2.3) is the simultaneous definition of
An example should clarify matters.
where t is l(ap(ap(z, z 1 ), z 2 )) and t is l(ap(r(ap(ap(z, z 1 ),
where
Γ is z : B, z 1 : U, z 2 : U , and
The translations A ∀ Γ require that the ∀-extended L-formulas -let us call them L ∀ -formulas -have terms/arguments drawn not only from Var but from the least set Var ∀ satisfying the equation
where, writing Pow f in (X) for the set of finite subsets of X, 
To interpret elements of Var
For anaphoric uses of universally quantified variables (illustrated by the variables x 1 , x 2 and x 3 in the example above), let us interpret s ∈ Var ∀ relative not only to a variable assignment f in Var M but also a non-empty subset F of Var M . That interpretation s F,f is defined as follows.
If s is a variable, say x, then
Otherwise (s is not a variable), s F,f is defined iff there is a g ∈ F such that s ∈ dom(g ∀ ) and for all h ∈ F such that s ∈ dom(h ∀ ), g ∀ (s) = h ∀ (s). In that case, s F,f is g ∀ (s).
Notice that x F,f is independent of F , whereas if s ∈ Var, then s F,f is independent of f . 
Now, writing Var
and so if the arguments s i are variables
are pretty much as in §3.1 (with ||(∃x ∈ U )ϕ|| ∀ M assigning x the same value u, regardless of the f ∈ F ). The clause for ∀ diverges from §3.
the intuition behind p being that it is the "image collapse" of a proof in the dependent function space interpretation ( x : U ) of (∀x ∈ U ).
in Proposition 9 collects together variables assignments according to 
and allowing the rest to be "dynamic"
). This completes the ingredients for Proposition 9, which now follows by a routine induction on D ∀ -derivations of Γ ⇒ A wff.
It is perhaps worth noting that there is more to L ∀ -formulas than the fragment Proposition 9 covers. This includes simple translations of discourses such as (c) from Groenendijk and Stokhof [11] .
(c)
Every player chooses a pawn. He puts it on square one.
The interested reader is referred to Fernando [7] , where the step from f ∈ Var M to non-empty sets F ⊆ Var M of such is linked to conjunctive branching, introduced into dynamic logic in Peleg [23] and widely found in so-called and/or graphs for 2-person games.
Discussion
Having associated dynamic and proof-conditional semantics (in the introduction) with the intriguing proposals (D) and (P), suggesting that truth be updated and proofs used in constructing well-formed formulas, let us conclude by reviewing how these ideas have fared in the synthesis attempted above. With an eye on not only truth but context change, we pushed our semantic analysis (in section 3) of the translations A • Γ (from section 2) beyond truth equivalence, Lemma 6c, to bisimulation equivalence, Theorem 7. However edifying the extra work in forming bisimulations may have been, we carried our analysis of A ∀ Γ (in section 4) only up to Proposition 9, the ∀-analog of Lemma 6c. In falling short of the ∀-analog of Theorem 7, we invited speculation as to whether the author had finally run out of steam or had decided not to try the patience of his indulgent reader further. Be that as it may, an obvious defect in the link forged between dynamic and proof-conditional semantics is the omission of many of the rules in the set D (defined in §4.1). Differences in empirical coverage between formalisms can be a touchy matter, especially when trade-offs are involved (e.g. for DRT vs TTG, see Watson [28] ). Obviously, extra-logical "linguistic" considerations must enter into translations of English to well-formed formulas. But it is far from clear whether to tolerate, in their absence, cases of overgeneration or of undergeneration. In other words, should linguistics contribute constraints or generative mechanisms? The former would suit TTG, as the inferential possibilities TTG generates ought to be constrained by linguistic factors. Among these factors, many have observed, is the difference in (g) above between definite descriptions such as her gift and pronouns such as it.
Derivation versus interpretation

NVC revisited: a clash of paradigms and beyond
By admitting formalizations of proofs relative to rule sets into proof-conditional semantics, have we reduced dynamic semantics into a proof-conditional fragment given by some rule set such as D • (or perhaps D ∀ )? This would be surprising, given that proof-conditional semantics can (under propositions-astypes) be seen as a declarative (functional) programming language (e.g. Girard, Lafont and Taylor [10] ) whereas dynamic semantics is commonly associated with assignment-based (imperative) programs. Indeed, the thrust of (D) has more than once been identified with a procedural turn in semantics. Declarative though it may be, however, TTG is arguably more dynamic than dynamic semantics. Type-theoretic context change yields (in D, if not D • ) many more terms for anaphoric reference. But then the potential of procedural programming is barely scratched by the applications above. One of the culprits is the novel variable condition (NVC), which bans re-assignments to variables.
Why rob procedural programming of some of its power by imposing NVC? The reason can be traced to the reduction of programs in dynamic logic to their input/output relations. A crucial clause is relational composition f ||ϕ ∧ ψ|| M f iff f ||ϕ|| M g and g||ψ|| M f for some g ,
discarding intermediate outputs g. This is evidently at gross variance with the retention of witnesses in (witnesses to existential claims being one of the characteristic pre-occupations of intuitionistic logic). But now, if each output f to ||ψ|| M encodes all the information in the input g, then nothing is lost in throwing out intermediate outputs g in (10) . Enter persistence (5) from §3.1, stating that f ⊆ f whenever f ||ϕ|| M f .
Should we then never destroy information, and enshrine persistence as a principle of interpretation? Arguably not. While anaphoric possibilities may multiply during a discourse, some possibilities may also drop out (or at the very least degrade). Beyond that, non-monotonicity has become a significant feature of various accounts of discourse interpretation (e.g. Asher and Lascarides [3] ). Nevertheless, there is a widespread feeling that persistence has its place, immune from counter-examples of the kind just mentioned. Some such space is afforded by the distinction drawn in Kamp and Reyle [14] between (i) an algorithm translating English sentences (or some syntactic analyses thereof) into well-formed formulas and (ii) a scheme (e.g. || · || M ) interpreting such well-formed formulas modeltheoretically.
Persistence may find a home in (ii), if not in (i). Now, the trouble with characterizing DRT as a fragment of proof-conditional semantics is that, just as intuitionistic type theory reaches far beyond D • , the bulk of work in DRT revolves not around the input/output relations || · || M , but on some algorithm constructing logical forms for English discourse (e.g. van der Sandt [25] ). 14 What impact could replacing models by proofs have on the design of such an algorithm? Some answers are under way (e.g. Krause [18] , Krahmer and Piwek [17] , Fernando [8] ).
